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Book Review

Why Tax the Rich?
Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah†

Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich. Edited
by Joel B. Slemrod.∗ Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 524.
$57.95.
In Greek mythology, Atlas was a giant who carried the world on his
shoulders. In Ayn Rand’s 1957 novel Atlas Shrugged, Atlas represents the
“ prime movers” —the talented few who bear the weight of the world’s
economy.1 In the novel, the prime movers go on strike against the
oppressive burden of excessive regulation and taxation, leaving the world in
disarray and demonstrating how indispensable they are to the rest of us (the
“ second handers” ).
Rand wrote in a world in which the top marginal federal income tax
rate in the United States was 91% (beginning at taxable income of
$400,000).2 This is an unimaginably high rate by today’s standards, when
the dominant view in Washington is that a marginal rate of 39.6% (the top

† Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Yossi
Edrey, Allen Graubard, David Hasen, Judy Herman, Don Herzog, Jim Hines, Bob Kuttner, Doron
Lamm, Jeff Lehman, Kyle Logue, Dan Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Dennis Ventry, and Larry Zelenak
for their extremely helpful suggestions. All errors are mine.
* Paul W. McCracken Collegiate Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy,
University of Michigan.
1. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957).
2. Joel B. Slemrod, The Economics of Taxing the Rich, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 3, 3 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000) [hereinafter
DOES ATLAS SHRUG?].
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rate from 1993 to 2001) is too high.3 The key turning point in the process of
abandoning high marginal tax rates occurred in the presidency of Ronald
Reagan. When Reagan became President in 1981, the top marginal federal
income tax rate was 70%; when he left office in 1989, the top rate was
28%.4
The reduction of marginal tax rates in the Reagan years was driven by a
new policy consensus that still persists today. That consensus is that high
marginal tax rates on the rich come with an unaffordably high price for the
U.S. economy in the form of reduced incentives for the rich to work and to
save, and increased incentives to engage in socially wasteful tax planning.
And yet 1957, when Rand wrote Atlas Shrugged and the top income tax rate
was 91%, falls in the middle of the period from 1951 through 1963. Those
were the golden years of the U.S. economy, in which the average annual
rate of productivity growth was 3.1% (compared with about 1.5% after
1981).5 Of course, the growth might have been even faster had the marginal
tax rates been lower, but the coincidence of high rates and high productivity
raises challenging questions for those who believe that high marginal tax
rates carry an unacceptable cost.6
Thus, the question of whether high marginal tax rates come with an
unaffordably high cost to the U.S. economy remains unsettled. Does Atlas
Shrug?, a recent collection of papers written mostly by public finance
economists and superbly edited by Joel Slemrod, represents the most recent

3. I.R.C. § 1 (1994), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38. The Act reduces the top marginal rate from 39.6% to
35%, phased in gradually over the period 2001 to 2006. For the arguments leading to the
enactment of the 2001 Act, see, for example, the testimony of R. Glenn Hubbard, Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress:
[T]he key to the President’s plan is its focus on reducing marginal tax rates. . . . There
is now a large body of evidence that improving marginal incentives . . . is the key to
ensuring these investments in our economic future.
. . . High marginal tax rates are especially damaging.
....
The incentives provided by lower marginal tax rates are especially important for
the top marginal tax rate.
Cutting the top marginal tax rate leads to the greatest response in taxable income.
Hubbard Testimony at JEC Hearing on Economy, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 24, 2001, ¶¶ 43-52,
2001 TNT 101-66 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Hubbard Testimony].
4. MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 133 (1997); W. Elliot
Brownlee, Historical Perspectives on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?,
supra note 2, at 29, 61 tbl.2.6.
5. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 3.
6. Similarly, productivity soared again in the “ new economy” period of the late 1990s,
despite the Clinton tax increases of 1993 (which increased the top marginal tax rate from 31% to
39.6%). Productivity from 1995 to 2000 grew at close to 3% each year. ALAN S. BLINDER &
JANET L. YELLEN, THE FABULOUS DECADE: MACROECONOMIC LESSONS FROM THE 1990S, at 62
(2001).
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attempt to answer this question. Unfortunately, no clear-cut answer is
forthcoming in the book, and the debate is sure to rage on.7
This Review is divided into three Parts. In Part I, I summarize the main
findings of Does Atlas Shrug?, emphasizing their contribution to the debate
on taxing the rich. In Parts II and III, I discuss a question that is only briefly
touched on in the book: Why should the rich be taxed? Part II surveys the
existing—and to me incomplete—legal literature on this issue, while Part
III begins to outline some tentative alternative answers. In my view, the
debate about the economic consequences of taxing the rich has obscured
this fundamental normative question, and answering it is essential to
assessing the merits and relevance of the findings contained in Slemrod’s
book.
I. THE ECONOMIC COST OF TAXING THE RICH:
DOES ATLAS REALLY SHRUG?
Slemrod’s book is divided into three parts. Part I provides history and
background. Part II is the heart of the book and contains nine new empirical
studies on the behavioral responses of the rich to taxation. Part III is called
“ alternative perspectives” and discusses taxation of the rich on the basis of
assumptions that deviate from the standard ones underlying the economic
models of Part II.
Part I begins with an excellent historical survey by W. Elliot Brownlee
of the rates facing the rich from the beginning of the U.S. income tax in
1913 to the present. In terms of the top marginal rate, the income tax began
modestly at 7%, but climbed precipitously to 77% during World War I.
Post-war reductions brought the rate down to 25% (in 1925), but during the
Hoover Administration it went back up to 63% (in 1932). The rise in rates
continued through the New Deal and culminated during World War II,
when the top marginal rate reached 94% (in 1944-1945). The top rate
remained at 91% until 1964, when it was reduced to 77%, and then to 70%
in 1974. The Reagan tax cuts sharply reduced the top rate to 28% by 1986.
The rate then grew to 31% in the “ read my lips” tax hike of 1990, and to
39.6% in the Clinton tax increase of 1993, before being reduced again to
35% (phased in to become fully effective in 2006) in the Bush tax cut of
2001.8

7. Compare GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 188, 245 (1981) (arguing that “ [a]
successful economy depends on the proliferation of the rich,” and that “ to help the poor and
middle classes, one must cut the tax rates of the rich” ), with Robert Lenzner & Stephen S.
Johnson, Seeing Things as They Really Are, FORBES, Mar. 10, 1997, at 122, 124 (discussing Peter
Drucker’s view that “ [i]f all the super rich disappeared, the world economy would not even
notice. The super rich are irrelevant to the economy” ).
8. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 41-63.
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Statutory marginal tax rates are important for their symbolic
significance and incentive effects, but from an economic perspective, it is
just as important to determine the effective tax rate facing the rich. The
effective rate is the rate the rich pay after taking into account lower rates for
lower brackets of income and the available deductions, credits, and other
methods of narrowing the tax base (i.e., reducing the taxable income on
which the marginal rate is imposed). Brownlee helpfully provides estimates
of the historical effective rates for the richest one percent of households as
well. He indicates that effective rates during the high marginal rate years of
World War I reached 15.8%, and that during the high marginal rate years of
World War II they reached an astonishing 58.6% in 1944.9 After the war,
while the top marginal rate remained extremely high at 91%, the effective
rate for the rich declined to 32.2% in 1952, then 24.6% in 1963, rising to
28.9% when Ronald Reagan took office and declining to 22.1% following
the 1986 tax reductions.10 More recent estimates for the Clinton years are
not yet available. The conclusion drawn by Brownlee is that the rich can be
taxed at very high effective rates during times of national emergency, but
that at other times their political clout ensures that effective rates are much
lower than marginal rates. It turns out that when Ayn Rand was writing
Atlas Shrugged, the actual burden borne by the “ prime movers” was not so
high after all; by the late 1940s the rich had “ largely succeeded in removing
the redistributional fangs from the movement for progressive taxation.” 11
Another introductory chapter by Edward N. Wolff attempts to identify
“ the rich” by looking at demographic data from 1983 to 1992. He focuses
on the top one percent of U.S. households (by wealth) and shows that in
1992 they owned 35.9% of total wealth (up from 32.6% in 1983) and
earned 15.7% of total income (up from 12.8% in 1983)—a remarkable rise,
which continued through the 1990s.12 Wolff also shows how the
demographics of the richest one percent changed from 1983 to 1992. The
rich became younger and earned more labor income and less income from
property.13 The rich were also more likely to be self-employed and less
likely to be salaried managers or professionals.14
The final introductory chapter by Douglas A. Shackelford analyzes the
current tax environment facing the rich, which includes both income and
transfer taxes (the estate and gift tax). Shackelford shows that under the
9. Id. at 45 tbl.2.3, 60 tbl.2.5.
10. Id. at 61 tbl.2.6.
11. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 20.
12. Edward N. Wolff, Who Are the Rich? A Demographic Profile of High-Income and HighWealth Americans, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 74, 78 tbl.3.2.
13. Fifteen percent of heads of the richest one percent of households in 1992 were under
forty-five, compared to only 10% in 1983; 69% earned labor income in 1992, compared to 51% in
1983; and 27% earned income from property, compared to 46% in 1983. Id. at 79, 80-82 tbl.3.3.
14. Id. at 92-93.

AVI-YONAHFINAL.DOC

2002]

FEBRUARY 26, 2002 2/26/02 5:38 PM

Why Tax the Rich?

1395

most tax-disadvantaged form of earning income (in which the income is
taxed as ordinary income when earned and interest on the after-tax income
is taxed again, and what remains is subject to the estate tax), the marginal
tax rate facing the rich can be as high as 91%. He also shows, however, that
various forms of legal tax avoidance (e.g., transforming ordinary income
into capital gains, postponing realization of capital gains, making tax-free
gifts, and transferring future interests to heirs) can reduce the effective tax
rate to close to zero.15
The core of the book is the nine empirical studies of Part II. In general,
they provide a mixed answer to the question of what the economic costs are
of taxing the rich. While there is some evidence of behavioral responses, it
is quite limited and seems to depend crucially on the authors’ chosen
methodology. Importantly, most of the findings of behavioral response
relate to the use of various tax avoidance techniques—and even there the
evidence is mixed, with some obvious techniques being used less than they
should be in a world in which tax minimization is very important to the
rich. Real behaviors, such as labor and saving, seem much less affected by
taxation. This distinction is important because while both tax avoidance
techniques and real behavioral changes cause deadweight losses, the former
can be partially prevented by changing the law, while the latter are less
amenable to legal change since one cannot force the rich to work or save
more.
The papers in Part II can be divided into three broad groups. The first
group contains studies that address the limitations of the previous literature
on the economic consequences of taxing the rich. Thus, the chapter by
Austan Goolsbee responds to the “ new tax responsiveness” (NTR)
literature pioneered by Lawrence Lindsey (President George W. Bush’s
chief economic adviser) and Martin Feldstein. The traditional economics
literature found little evidence that high tax rates discourage labor supply
by the rich. The NTR literature focused instead on the elasticity of taxable
income and, by using “ natural experiments” (tax rate increases and
decreases), found very high responsiveness (elasticities exceeding one).16
Goolsbee argues, however, that this literature is fatally flawed because it
assumes that the rich are similar to other income groups except for their
higher tax rates. In fact, the rich are different in at least three ways. First,
their incomes have recently been trending upward at a rate that is faster
than others’ incomes, which, in a time of tax cuts for the rich, can appear as

15. Douglas A. Shackelford, The Tax Environment Facing the Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 114, 121, 130-32.
16. This means that for every one percent increase in the tax rate, taxable income decreases
by over one percent. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable
Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551 (1995); Lawrence
Lindsey, Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts 1982-1984, 33 J. PUB. ECON. 173 (1987).
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tax responsiveness.17 Second, the rich are more sensitive to demand
conditions than others, and therefore their incomes tend to surge in good
times that also happen to coincide with tax cuts.18 Finally, the compensation
of the rich can easily be moved to a different taxable year, and consequently
observed changes in taxable income may reflect timing rather than longlasting behavioral responses to tax changes.19 Goolsbee estimates that the
combination of these factors cuts the NTR elasticities by over seventy-five
percent.20 Similarly, the chapter by Gordon and Slemrod suggests that
natural experiments around the 1986 Act can be misleading because they
reflect shifting of income from corporations (whose rates went up) to
individuals (whose rates went down).21
The second group is made up of studies that support the view that
behavioral responses by the rich to taxation are quite limited. A study by
Moffitt and Wilhelm investigates the labor supply decisions of the rich
based on responses to the 1986 Tax Reform Act and finds essentially no
responsiveness of the hours of work of high-income men to tax
reductions.22 This finding is consistent with previous studies that reached
the same conclusion. It also makes intuitive sense because high-income
men tend to work very long hours in any case and are unlikely to be able to
increase them easily. But the studies also suggest that high-income men are
unlikely to decrease hours worked as tax rates go up—either because they
find the work inherently satisfying (there is no “ substitution effect” ) or
because they focus more on maximizing their after-tax income (there is an
offsetting “ income effect” ).23
Other studies in this group suggest that even financial behaviors, which
are less “ real,” and therefore more likely to be tax-motivated than labor or
saving decisions, do not respond much to taxation. For example, Andrew A.
Samwick finds that portfolio choice (e.g., investing in tax-exempt
securities) is not significantly responsive to changes in the tax rate.
Predicted effects from tax changes constitute only about ten percent of
observed changes, and the portfolio responses of the wealthy do not seem
more tax-related than the responses of people in other net worth

17. Austan Goolsbee, It’s Not About the Money: Why Natural Experiments Don’t Work on
the Rich, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 141, 148-51.
18. Id. at 151-52.
19. Id. at 152-55.
20. Id. at 156. This means that every one percent increase in the tax rate decreases taxable
income by less than 0.25%.
21. See Roger H. Gordon & Joel B. Slemrod, Are “Real” Responses to Taxes Simply Income
Shifting Between Corporate and Personal Tax Bases?, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 2, at
240.
22. See Robert A. Moffitt & Mark O. Wilhelm, Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of
the Affluent, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 193.
23. In the latter case there would still be a deadweight loss because they would have preferred
to work less.
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categories.24 Likewise, Auerbach, Burman, and Siegel conclude in their
chapter on capital gains taxation that high-income people do not generally
shelter most or all of their capital gains with judicious realization of capital
losses.25 James Poterba analyzes the effect of estate and gift taxes on inter
vivos giving and finds that the actual levels of giving are much lower than
one would expect if households were taking full advantage of this estate tax
avoidance technique.26
The third and final group is made up of studies that do find some
behavioral responses to taxation. For example, Auten, Clotfelter, and
Schmalbeck find that the current tax system does stimulate some charitable
giving by the wealthy, compared with a system in which contributions are
not deductible, but that the sensitivity of giving to tax changes is smaller
than suggested by previous researchers.27 They also find that current law
does encourage the wealthy to engage in elaborate estate tax arrangements
associated with their charitable donations.28 Alm and Wallace examine a
wide range of taxpayer reporting decisions29 by the rich in the wake of tax
law changes and suggest that they show increased responsiveness due to
their larger control over the form of their compensation.30 Finally, Carroll,
Holtz-Eakin, Rider, and Rosen investigate the behavior of entrepreneurs in
response to tax rate increases and conclude that individual income taxes do
have a large negative effect (a five percent increase in marginal tax rates
decreases mean capital expenditures by approximately ten percent).31
Slemrod summarizes these findings by stating:
Taken as a whole . . . the evidence of part II is more mixed on the
question of how, and how much, today’s Atlases shrug. . . . All in
all, these studies do not suggest anything like the complete
withdrawal of productive energies that Ayn Rand warned of.
Nevertheless, the tax system clearly induces people to rearrange
24. Andrew A. Samwick, Portfolio Responses to Taxation: Evidence from the End of the
Rainbow, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 289, 318.
25. Alan J. Auerbach et al., Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Avoidance: New Evidence from
Panel Data, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 355, 380.
26. See James M. Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 329.
27. Gerald E. Auten et al., Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 392, 414-18.
28. Id. at 418.
29. Such decisions include reporting wage income or capital gains, as opposed to unrealized
appreciation. James Alm & Sally Wallace, Are the Rich Different?, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?,
supra note 2, at 165, 184.
30. Id.
31. Robert Carroll et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 427. This is the only study in the book that finds a behavioral response
to taxation that implicates real behaviors (as opposed to tax avoidance schemes). Not surprisingly,
it is also the only study from the book that was cited by Hubbard in his testimony before
Congress. See Hubbard Testimony, supra note 3, ¶ 47. Hubbard also cited the NTR literature
without mentioning the limitations identified by Goolsbee. Id. ¶ 52 (citing Feldstein).
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their affairs and change their behavior, and these changes are
evidence of an unseen but real cost of levying taxes.32
I agree with this assessment. I would also add that most of the evidence for
behavioral responses in the book relates to tax avoidance strategies (e.g.,
charitable giving techniques, shifting income from corporations to
individuals, and the timing of receipts), rather than to real activities (labor
and saving decisions). This difference is important because tax avoidance
techniques can in theory be addressed by making the tax base more
comprehensive and enforcement more effective—as it presumably was
when the rich paid a 58.6% effective rate during World War II.33
The question of whether the rich can effectively be taxed is related to
another aspect of taxation that is almost not addressed in the book—the
possibility of illegal tax evasion. In other countries, there is evidence that
the “ underground economy” that is not reported to the tax authorities is as
much as fifty percent of GDP. The size of the “ tax gap” in the United
States is presumably much smaller (we have the best collection system in
the world, although it depends heavily on withholding and information
reporting), and much of it is not applicable to the rich (e.g., tipping
income). But there is one avenue of evading taxes that is particularly open
to the rich—shifting the income to tax havens overseas and not reporting it
to the IRS. This form of tax evasion is more available to the rich because
income from capital is easier to shift than labor income, and the rich earn
more income from capital. There are no solid recent estimates of how much
tax evasion of this sort is engaged in by U.S. residents. But in other
developed countries, such as Germany, tax evasion by capital owners is
estimated to be rampant (about fifty percent of interest income by German
residents is estimated not to be reported).34 Slemrod is not to be blamed for
not focusing on this issue because no recent data exist, but it is high time
for Congress to study the question of illegal tax evasion by Americans.
Such a study could provide a much-needed stimulus for current efforts by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to
bear down on the tax havens (in the face of considerable opposition from
the Bush Administration).
The main drawback of the volume from a lawyer’s perspective is that it
concentrates almost entirely on the economic issue of the behavioral effects
32. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 24.
33. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Slemrod has suggested doing just that. See JOEL
SLEMROD & WOJCIECH KOPCZUK, THE OPTIMAL ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE INCOME (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7922, 2000); Joel Slemrod, Fixing the Leak in
Okun’s Bucket: Optimal Tax Progressivity when Avoidance Can Be Controlled, 55 J. PUB. ECON.
41 (1994).
34. On this issue, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1583 (2000).
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of taxation on the rich and omits almost entirely any discussion of why the
rich should be taxed. This is understandable because, as Slemrod writes,
“ [h]ow much and how to tax high-income individuals are questions at the
core of many recent proposals for incremental as well as fundamental tax
reform. The right answers depend in part on value judgments to which
economic analysis has little to contribute.” 35 The rest of this Review
concentrates on those noneconomic questions. It should be noted, however,
that the answers to these questions as well depend in part on useful input
from economists, and this input will be reflected in the remaining sections.
II. WHY TAX THE RICH: CURRENT ANSWERS
In 1952, when tax rates were, as noted above, steeply progressive,
Walter Blum and Harry Kalven published a classic article entitled The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation.36 Blum and Kalven used most of the
article to demolish systematically all previous arguments for progressivity
made in the name of “ ability to pay” and “ equal sacrifice.” 37 In the end,
they concluded that any remaining case for progressivity must be made in
the name of redistribution, or an inherent objection to social inequality, but
without explaining what makes inequality objectionable. This is the same
type of “ aesthetic” argument that motivated Henry Simons’s oft-quoted
conclusion in Personal Income Taxation (published in 1938 at the height of
New Deal progressivism) that sharply graduated rates are defensible only
because there is something inherently “ unlovely” about inequality.38
Blum and Kalven’s skepticism about graduated rates remained the
standard view among legal theorists until 1987. In that year, just after the
progressive rate structure had been demolished in the 1986 Act, Joseph
Bankman and Thomas Griffith published an article that has shaped the
progressivity debate among legal scholars ever since.39 Bankman and
Griffith’s main contribution was to introduce into the legal literature
optimal tax theory, developed by economist James Mirrlees in his Nobel
Prize-winning work in the early seventies.40

35. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 19-20.
36. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
37. Id. at 445-86. The basic problem with previous arguments in favor of progressivity was
that they depended on interpersonal comparisons of utility or well-being, which, as Blum and
Kalven pointed out, are not feasible. Id. at 476. This problem is addressed in the more recent
optimal tax literature by introducing the social welfare function, discussed below.
38. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 19 (1938).
39. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987).
40. James Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
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Optimal tax theory seeks to answer the following question: Given that
income taxes generate a disincentive effect on work, what is the ideal tax
and transfer system if the ultimate goal is to maximize the sum of the
utilities of individuals with identical preferences? To answer this question,
optimal tax theory makes a series of assumptions regarding the distribution
of income-earning ability in society, the rate at which the marginal utility of
income declines, and how much less the imposition of an income tax causes
individuals to work. Having made these assumptions, optimal tax theorists
then derive the desirable combination of taxes and transfers from a
specified social welfare function. This function can be either strictly
utilitarian (i.e., maximizing the sum of individuals’ utilities without
assigning weights) or more weighted toward the welfare of the poor. At the
extreme is the Rawlsian maximin function, in which the goal is to
maximize the welfare of the least-well-off member of society.
The problem for advocates of progressive taxation is that most tax
structures derived from optimal tax theory are not marginal-rate
progressive. For example, Bankman and Griffith’s article, even though it is
cast as a defense of progressive income taxation against Blum and Kalven,
actually proposes a regressive marginal rate structure. The progressivity in
their proposal comes entirely from its combination with a demogrant (a
universal payment to all residents) which makes the average tax rate
progressive. But as Larry Zelenak and Kemper Moreland point out, average
rates are less important than marginal rates when it comes to taxing the rich.
If the tax system consisted of a $10,000 demogrant and a 30% flat tax, the
average rate would be progressive, but Bill Gates would pay taxes at just
under 30%, and we could not increase his rate without increasing everyone
else’s. Fundamentally, “ graduated rates permit much greater flexibility in
average rate distributions than does a flat tax with a demogrant or an
exemption.” 41 In addition, as Zelenak and Moreland also point out,
demogrants are unlikely in the United States on political grounds, and,
without demogrants, the progressivity of Bankman and Griffith’s proposal
disappears.42
Other optimal tax writers have likewise proposed regressive tax rate
structures.43 Mirrlees’s original work in 1971 concluded that the optimal tax
41. Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal
Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 59 (1999).
42. Id. at 60-62.
43. Most strikingly, Seade and Sadka have shown that under certain assumptions, optimal tax
analysis concludes that the marginal tax rate at the highest level of income should be precisely
zero. The reason for this surprising finding is that raising the marginal tax rate at the very top of
the income distribution above zero distorts the labor supply decision of the highest earner but
raises no revenue. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 11 (citing Efraim Sadka, On Income Distribution,
Incentive Effects, and Optimal Income Taxation, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 261 (1976); and Jesus
Seade, On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 203 (1974)). As Slemrod points
out, this conclusion is not very interesting because it applies only precisely at the top of the
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structure is approximately linear (with an exemption) and has tax rates
between 20% and 30%.44 Slemrod, Yitzhaki, Mayshar, and Lundholm
investigated a two-bracket system and concluded that for most assumptions,
the optimal tax structure features a top marginal rate that is lower than the
first marginal rate, although the combination with a demogrant assures
average rate progressivity.45
The reason why optimal tax theory generally rejects progressive
marginal rates is as follows. While the assumed declining marginal utility
of income supports redistribution, any countervailing efficiency losses
apply only at the margin (the point at which the taxpayer chooses between
work and leisure). Since high tax rates on inframarginal income do not
impact work decisions, they raise revenue for redistribution without any
efficiency cost. Thus, there should be high tax rates at a range in which
there are many taxpayers for which the range is submarginal, relative to the
number of taxpayers at the margin within that range (i.e., the middle class).
But the tax rate should be low in the income range where there are mostly
marginal taxpayers—i.e., the higher income ranges.46 Therefore, as Matti
Tuomala has noted, “ [o]ne of the main conclusions to be drawn from the
Mirrleesian optimal non-linear income tax model is that it is difficult (if at
all possible) to find a convincing argument for a progressive marginal tax
rate structure throughout.” 47
Larry Zelenak and Kemper Moreland have recently mounted a vigorous
defense of progressive marginal rates against the optimal tax critique. They
point out that the above conclusions rest crucially on several untested
assumptions, and if these assumptions are relaxed, progressive marginal
rates can be accommodated within optimal tax theory. Specifically, they
point out that optimal tax theory can be consistent with progressive
marginal rates if (1) demogrants are ruled out on political grounds;
(2) concern with relative position (envy) figures into the social welfare
function; (3) taxation serves as a form of insurance against wage
uncertainty; (4) high income taxpayers are less responsive to the work
disincentive effect of taxation; (5) the distribution of ability in the
population is more unequal than is usually assumed; or (6) the labor market
consists in large part of winner-take-all competitions.48
income distribution, not near the top. Id. at 12. Numerical calculations by Mirrlees suggest that
zero is a bad approximation to the optimal marginal tax rate even within most of the top
percentiles. Mirrlees, supra note 40, at 195.
44. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 10.
45. Id. at 12 (citing Joel Slemrod et al., The Optimal Two-Bracket Linear Income Tax, 53 J.
PUB. ECON. 269 (1994)).
46. Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 41, at 54-55.
47. MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 14 (1990).
48. Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 41, at 56-57; see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice
G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
1 (1998) (defending progressive taxation in a winner-take-all society).
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Most of these modifications to the standard assumptions seem
plausible.49 However, as Zelenak and Moreland point out, their argument
merely means that taxing the rich at higher rates is possible under an
optimal tax analysis, not that it is indicated:
Regardless of the results of any simulation, optimal tax analysis can
never prove that the income tax should have progressive marginal
rates. Even if a simulation indicated gradual rates were optimal, and
even if the simulation’s factual assumptions were unassailable, an
opponent of progression could still dismiss the results by rejecting
the philosophical basis of the simulation. If the premises of the
simulation are utilitarian or Rawlsian, no amount of sophisticated
mathematics will convince someone who objects to those
premises.50
Fundamentally, the problem with optimal tax theory is that, like any
welfarist theory, it focuses completely on the well-being of individuals. 51
But a society is more than the sum of the individuals who compose it at any
given moment in time. A society is a community with a shared culture and
shared interests that transcend the interests of its individual members and
extend back to its historical roots and forward into its future. Thus, it is
necessary to look for affirmative reasons for taxing the rich that are rooted
in a broader social and historical understanding of the vital function of
taxation in maintaining such a community over time. The remaining Parts
of this Review represent an initial attempt in that direction.

49. Some of them are supported by evidence in Slemrod’s book. See the findings on laborleisure substitution in Moffitt & Wilhelm, supra note 22, at 221, and the relative position
argument in Robert H. Frank, Progressive Taxation and the Incentive Problem, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?, supra note 2, at 490, 498-503.
50. Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 41, at 90. The same criticisms apply to simulations that
recommend a regressive structure.
51. This individualistic framework is shared by utilitarians and liberals, which makes it
difficult for liberals to criticize optimal tax theory consistently. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery,
The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 281 (1994); Edward J.
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); Eric
Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419 (1996). But see Anne L. Alstott,
The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor
McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996) (arguing that a liberal philosophy cannot be used to
advocate repeal of the income and estate taxes); Liam B. Murphy, Liberty, Equality, Well-Being:
Rakowski on Wealth Transfer Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 473 (1996) (arguing that Rakowski’s
definition of liberalism, used to criticize wealth taxes, is too narrow). A better foundation for
critique is a communitarian viewpoint that relates back to the republican tradition and finds its
modern expression in the work of philosophers such as MacIntyre, Taylor, Walzer, and Sandel.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998).
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III. WHY TAX THE RICH? ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS
This Part begins to develop an alternative rationale for taxing the rich
that is based on a community-oriented rather than an individual-oriented
view of society. In general, one can advance three broad reasons for taxing
the rich: that they control a disproportionately large share of the country’s
wealth, that their wealth is not just the result of their own choices but also
stems from a combination of benefits conferred by society and brute luck,
and that their wealth gives the rich a social, economic, and political power
base that is inimical to the proper functioning of a democratic polity.
A. “That’s Where the Money Is” 52
If one accepts the need for redistribution on other grounds, the most
obvious response to the question of why the rich should be taxed is found in
Willie Sutton’s immortal response to the question why he robbed banks. In
1994, the top one percent of taxpayers by gross income received 13.8% of
total income and remitted 28.7% of total federal personal income tax.
Increasing these payments by 25% would generate $38.2 billion in
additional tax revenue and would finance a 10% across-the-board tax cut
for the other ninety-nine percent of U.S. taxpayers.53
Even more significant is the wealth of the rich. In 1983 the top one
percent of wealth-holders owned 32.6% of total net wealth and 42.9% of
financial wealth (wealth excluding houses and autos).54 In 1992, these
figures had increased to 35.9% of total net wealth and 45.6% of financial
wealth.55 The distribution of net savings is similarly skewed. The top one
percent of 1986 wealth-holders accounted for 53.7% of net real saving.56
Of course, the fact that the rich (defined as the top one percent by
wealth or income) hold disproportionately large percentages of the
country’s wealth does not by itself constitute an argument for taxing them
more. While these facts demonstrate the potential for large redistributive
gains by increasing taxes at the very top of the income distribution, they
also illustrate the importance of the rich to the economy and thus the
potential cost of taxing them.57 Thus, any argument for taxing the rich must
depend on more than mere income or wealth distribution numbers.

52. John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837,
862 (1994) (paraphrasing Willie Sutton).
53. Tax Found., Latest Data Shows Trend Reversal: Top 1 Percent Not Paying Larger Share
of Federal Income Taxes, 40 TAX FEATURES 1 (1996).
54. See Wolff, supra note 12, at 78.
55. Id.
56. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 6.
57. See id.
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B. “I Took All of It from Them” 58
Another argument for taxing the rich can be summarized in department
store mogul Edward Filene’s explanation of why he approved of the income
tax: “ Why shouldn’t the American people take half my money from me? I
took all of it from them.” 59
Michael Graetz has justified taxing the rich by arguing that all incomegenerating activities depend on a combination of individuals’ own
contributions and a variety of services provided by the government. Those
services include the rule of law and the protection of private property, as
well as more tangible services such as infrastructure and education.60
Recent comparative research of economic growth has likewise highlighted
the importance of legal protections afforded by the government.61 From this
perspective, all income-generating activities can be conceived as a
partnership between individuals and the government, and taxation can be
justified as the government receiving its share of partnership income. This
argument thus serves as a rebuttal of the Lockean/Nozickian view that
individuals have an inherent right to their property, which is impeded by
redistributive taxation.62 Presumably, the government has the right to use its
partnership distributions as it sees fit, including by giving them to other
individuals.
There are, however, some problems with this conception. First, since it
is as focused on individual taxpayers as optimal tax theory, individual
taxpayers can object that the partnership does not apply to them.63 Second,
even if one accepts the partnership model, it is still unclear that it justifies
progressive taxation of the rich rather than mere proportionate taxation. Is

58. Jeffery L. Yablon & Shaw Pittman, As Certain as Death—Quotations About Taxes, 86
TAX NOTES 231, 267 (2000) (quoting Edward A. Filene).
59. Id.
60. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 275-76
(1983) (arguing that market rewards also depend on factors beyond the control of individuals such
as demand, social resources, and general societal conditions); see also Yosef Edrey, Hukah
Deklarativit U-benuyah: Hazekhut lekinyan tahat ha-mishpat ha-hukati ha-yisraeli u-mekoma
besulam hazekhuyot hahukatiyot [A Declarative and a Constructed Constitution: The Right for
Property Under the Israeli Constitutional Law and Its Location on the Constitutional Rights
Scale], 28 MISHPATIM 461 (1997) (providing an elaborate and expanded argument for society’s
role in producing income).
61. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (finding that the
rule of law is a crucial component in concentration of corporate ownership and further arguing
that concentration of corporate ownership explains growth differentials).
62. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360-62 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). But Locke also seems to concede that a parliamentary
majority may tax as much as it wants. Id. at 362.
63. From a communitarian perspective, however, this objection is irrelevant: The rich can be
deemed to have entered into a social contract that gives society the right to tax them. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-13 (1971); SANDEL, supra note 51, at 123-24.
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there any reason to assume that the government contributes more to the
success of the rich, and, therefore, its partnership share should be larger?
Theodore Roosevelt certainly believed there was. “ The man of great
wealth,” he stated in 1906 while arguing for progressive taxation, “ owes a
peculiar obligation to the State, because he derives special advantages from
the mere existence of government.” 64 But this is hard to prove, and many
government services (such as national defense) benefit the poor as well as
the rich. In general, the partnership theory is based on the view that taxation
is justified as a payment for benefits received rather than on ability-to-pay
grounds. But benefits-based taxation is typically not progressive, just
proportionate.65
Another way of conceptualizing the benefit derived by the rich from
society is that the rich were lucky. In fact, there is some evidence that
economic success depends more on luck than on skills, although “ [t]hose
who are lucky tend, of course, to impute their success to skill.” 66 It is
unclear whether luck plays a larger part in the success of the rich than in
that of everyone else, although introducing luck (in the form of wage
uncertainty) is one way of permitting progressivity to occur within the
optimal tax framework. Thus, it is not clear that the partnership model
supports progressivity specifically, as opposed to supporting the income tax
or the estate tax in general.
C. “Money Is the Measuring Rod of Power” 67
Howard Hughes’s remark is echoed by the words of other very rich
people68 and serves to explain a puzzling phenomenon: Why do the rich
strive to increase their wealth when any conceivable use of that additional
wealth for consumption purposes is already provided for by their existing
resources? For example, if one estimates Mr. Gates’s wealth at a
conservative fifty billion dollars, he would have to spend over twelve
million dollars per day to consume the interest earned on his existing
wealth.

64. 41 CONG. REC. 27 (1906) (remarks of Theodore Roosevelt), quoted in Dennis J. Ventry,
Jr., Equity vs. Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE
(Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. & Joseph J. Thorndike eds., forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 1, on file
with author).
65. FREDERICK A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 316 (1960). For a critique, see
Barbara H. Fried, Why Proportionate Taxation?, in TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64 (manuscript at 4,
on file with author).
66. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 227 (1972).
67. Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra
note 2, at 478 (quoting Howard Hughes).
68. Id. at 478-79 (collecting quotations).
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Christopher Carroll has assembled considerable evidence that the rich
derive utility from the mere possession of wealth over and above its
consumption value. He begins by noting that the standard life-cycle model
of household consumption and saving decisions, which assumes that people
save to finance their own future consumption, cannot explain the behavior
of the rich.69 Moreover, a “ dynastic” model, under which the rich save
mainly for the benefit of their heirs, cannot explain why childless, elderly
rich people save as much of their wealth as their counterparts with
children.70 Carroll then argues that the best explanation for observed
behaviors of the rich is a model in which they derive utility from the pursuit
of wealth for its own sake, or from the added power that comes from the
accumulation of wealth. This is well documented in discussions of the
“ Gilded Age” of 1870-1910: “ ‘[T]he ultimate gift of colossal wealth, at
least for the founders of the richest families [of the Gilded Age], was
power.’” 71 The Gilded Age financier James Stillman similarly remarked
that “ [’t]wasn’t the money we were after, ’twas the power. We were all
playing for power. It was a great game.” 72 And Cornelius Vanderbilt
explained that he did not want to give away the wealth he did not need for
consumption because “ [i]f you give away the surplus, you give away the
control.” 73
Wealth confers power beyond its consumption value.74 This power is
economic, social, and political. The economic power of the rich derives
primarily from their ability to use their wealth to invest in enterprises that
employ thousands of people and can dominate large sectors of the
economy. The social element derives from the knowledge other people
have of the potential ability of the rich to use their wealth to acquire goods
and to contribute to charities, which leads them to court such acquisitions
and contributions even without such consumption taking place. Finally, the
political power of the rich stems not just from their actual donations or their
ability to finance runs for political office, but, more importantly, from
politicians knowing that they have the excess funds to donate. Note that
none of these three forms of power depends on actual (as opposed to
69. Id. at 466-70.
70. Id. at 470-73.
71. Id. at 478 (quoting Frederic Cople Jaher, The Gilded Elite: American Multimillionaires,
1865 to Present, in WEALTH AND THE WEALTHY IN THE MODERN WORLD 189, 215 (W.D.
Rubinstein ed., 1980)).
72. Id. at 478 (quoting James Stillman).
73. Id. at 479 (quoting Cornelius Vanderbilt).
74. Alstott, supra note 51, at 371-72. On the definition of power in political science and
sociology, see, for example, KENNETH E. BOULDING, THREE FACES OF POWER 10, 15 (1989),
which defines power as “ the ability to get what one wants” and distinguishing threat, economic,
and integrative power—the stick, the carrot, and the hug; VALERI G. LEDYAEV, POWER: A
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (1997); POWER (Steven Lukes ed., 1986); POWER: CRITICAL CONCEPTS
(John Scott ed., 1994); and POWER IN MODERN SOCIETIES (Marvin E. Olsen & Martin N. Marger
eds., 1993).
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potential) consumption by the rich. As the eminent public finance
economist Richard Musgrave has stated, a consumption tax is deficient
because it “ assumes that consumption, current or future, is the only benefit
that income provides. This overlooks the benefits derived from the
accumulation and holding of wealth, whether in terms of security, power, or
social standing.” 75
If this analysis is true, what does it imply for taxing the rich? From an
optimal tax perspective, arguing that the rich derive added utility from their
wealth that is not available to people for whom (because of their lesser
means) money only has consumption value is an argument against taxing
the rich. That is because any redistribution in the optimal tax model derives
from its assumption of the declining marginal utility of money, and the
“ riches mean power” model militates against this assumption.76
But there is another, broader way of formulating the question. The
modern democratic state is built on the assumptions that all power should
ultimately reside in the people and their representatives, and that undue
concentrations of private power that is unaccountable to the people should
be discouraged.77 The origins of this conception go all the way back to the
feudal monarchy of the high Middle Ages, which was founded on the
“ feudal pyramid” with the monarch at its top. In a feudal monarchy, “ the
vassal of my vassal is not my vassal” : Power was explicitly distributed
throughout the pyramid.78 But from the twelfth century onward, European
monarchs waged a long struggle to concentrate power in themselves and
eliminate competing centers of power.79 As Tocqueville noted, the French

75. Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731, 733-34 (1996); see
also INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 351
(1978) (“ The holding of wealth itself . . . can confer on the owner benefits of security,
independence, influence and power, quite apart from any expenditure which the income from it
may finance.” ); William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to
Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 956 (1975) (“ It may well be unacceptable to rely
solely on consumption as a personal tax base because for some people wealth has a welfare value
above and beyond the deferred consumption it may operate to support . . . .” ). Indeed, the notion
that the difference between the rich and everyone else is merely that the rich have chosen to defer
their consumption and should not be penalized for doing so, which underlies many modern
defenses of consumption taxes, seems preposterous when applied to the super-rich. See SIMONS,
supra note 38, at 97 (“ In a world where capital accumulation proceeds as it does now, there is
something sadly inadequate about the idea of saving as postponed consumption.” ).
76. The declining marginal utility assumption is supported by empirical evidence regarding
insurance: The richer people are, the less likely they are to insure their lives (and income),
suggesting that their income has a declining marginal utility. See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage,
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948). But this decline is
not applicable to the distinction between the merely rich (top five percent) and the super-rich (top
one percent), which is crucial for a power-based analysis because only the super-rich do not
consume most of their wealth.
77. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 48).
78. See F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 88 (1952).
79. See THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tilly ed.,
1975); POWER ELITES AND STATE BUILDING (Wolfgang Reinhard ed., 1996).
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Revolution, with its explicit confiscation of lands belonging to the nobility,
was merely the culmination of this long trend, and in its aim was no
different from Louis XIV’s practice of forcing all noblemen to spend most
of the year at Versailles, away from their sources of landed power in the
provinces.80
The American Revolution likewise was founded on the conception that
while people have natural, Lockean liberal rights to their property, undue
concentrations of private power and wealth should be discouraged.81 This
view found its expression in the republican creed of civic humanism, which
emphasized public virtue as a balance to private rights. A virtuous republic,
the Framers believed, was to be free from concentrations of economic
power that characterized England in the eighteenth century.82 Therefore,
from the beginning of the Republic, federal and state legislators used
taxation to restrict privilege and to “ affirm communal responsibilities,
deepen citizenship, and demonstrate the fiscal virtues of a republican
citizenry.” 83 As Dennis Ventry has written,
The ideal of civic virtue created a unique form of ability-to-pay
taxation that was hostile to excess accumulation and to citizens who
asserted entitlement through birth. Inherited wealth, as well as
gross concentrations of wealth (inherited or not), characterized an
aristocratic society, not a free and virtuous republic.84
Until the late nineteenth century, these ideals found expression
primarily in state taxation of property, including intangible property such as
stocks.85 The short-lived federal income tax of the Civil War era was
permitted to expire in 1872. But in the 1890s, it became clear that the state
property taxes were unable to reach the large concentrations of wealth and
power resulting from industrialization.86 The Populists in the West and
South called for a progressive tax on corporate profits and high incomes to
reallocate the tax burden toward corporate monopolies and wealthy
shareholders.87 A progressive income tax was the way to break up

80. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION (François Furet
& Françoise Mélonio eds. & Alan S. Kahan trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) (1856); GEORGES
LEFEBVRE, THE COMING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 16-20 (R.R. Palmer trans., Vintage Books
1967) (1939).
81. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 4-5).
82. See id. (manuscript at 5).
83. W. Elliott Brownlee, Economic History and the Analysis of “Soaking-the-Rich” in 20th
Century America, in TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64 (manuscript at 1, on file with author); Brownlee,
supra note 4, at 31.
84. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 5).
85. Id.
86. The problem with taxing intangible forms of property was that it was difficult in
nineteenth-century conditions to find and value them. See id. (manuscript at 6-7).
87. Id. (manuscript at 7).
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undemocratic concentrations of economic power.88 This point is
emphasized by the most prominent historian of U.S. income taxation,
Elliott Brownlee:
[S]upport for a radical progressive income tax had far more to do
with the search for social justice in an industrializing nation than
with the quest for an elastic source of revenue. The progressive
income tax became an integral part of democratic statism—a
radical program of invoking instruments of government power to
create a more democratic social order by redistributing wealth.
Democratic statism represented a new kind of liberalism—the
adaptation to industrial conditions of classic nineteenth-century
liberalism and the commonwealth tradition of early republicanism,
which had included a distrust of commerce.89
The result of this reconceptualization of the republican ideal was the
federal income tax of 1894, which was struck down by the Supreme Court
in 1895 before it became effective,90 and ultimately the Sixteenth
Amendment91 (1913) and the modern U.S. federal income tax. The
Sixteenth Amendment was ratified (to the surprise of its supporters and
opponents alike) primarily because of the presidential campaign of 1912, in
which Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene Debs all
emphasized the need for a federal attack on monopoly power.92
Until World War II, high exemptions meant that the federal income tax
was primarily an instrument for taxing the rich, and it was conceived of
primarily as a means for curbing the economic power of the rich and of
large corporations.93 In the years immediately following 1913, there was an
increase in the concentration of income earned by the best paid individuals
88. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 36; Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 7).
89. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 36.
90. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Supreme Court held by
a 5-4 majority that the federal income tax was a tax on the underlying property and therefore
unconstitutional because it was not apportioned. “ What, in fact, is property, but a fiction, without
the beneficial use of it? In many cases, indeed, the income or annuity is the property itself.” Id. at
626. The decision has been much maligned, but it comports well with modern financial theory,
which points out that the value of property is but the present value of expected income flows from
that property. The decision was also justified if one believes that the purpose of the income tax
was to attack concentrations of wealth.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
92. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 40.
93. The initial exemption was $3000 for singles and $4000 for married couples; the result
was that only 1.5% of households paid income tax in 1913, and only 2% paid income tax on
average from 1913 to 1915. Id. at 41-42; Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 49 n.4). The richest
one percent paid 80% of federal income tax revenues in 1918. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 44;
Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 9). But the income tax became a mass-based tax as
exemptions were cut back during World War II (which also saw the introduction of wage
withholding and estimated tax payments). In 1939 four million Americans paid tax; the number
grew to forty-three million by 1945, an increase that was made possible by the introduction of
Social Security numbers. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 13).
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and by large corporations. Redistributive taxation was seen as a way of
curbing such undue power.94 Similarly, the New Deal tax increases in the
1930s were seen by FDR as a way to attack concentrations of wealth. In his
1934 message to Congress, FDR explained that accumulations of wealth
meant “ great and undesirable concentration of control in relatively few
individuals over the employment and welfare of many, many others.” 95 The
resulting 1935 Revenue Act, which the press called the “ Wealth Tax,”
increased the top marginal rate to seventy-seven percent, made the estate
tax more progressive, and created a graduated tax on corporations.96
There was another agenda at play as well in the early years of the
federal income tax: the desire to use progressive taxation as a way to “ stave
off more radical calls for industrial democracy.” 97 This explains why even
some high-income Republican groups supported the Sixteenth
Amendment.98 Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury in the 1920s and
one of the wealthiest Americans, “ believed that keeping tax schedules
graduated (albeit flatter) would mitigate radical demands for restructuring
the capitalist system.” 99 This agenda was similar to the one adopted by
Bismarck, the creator of the modern welfare state financed by progressive
taxation, whose explicit aim was to counter the appeal of the Communist
call for an even more radical redistribution of resources.100 Even Friedrich
Hayek supported progressive taxation for its symbolic value, although he
emphasized that taxing the rich was merely an illusion:
Indeed, it seems more than likely that the illusion that by means of
progressive taxation the cost of additional expenditure can be raised
from the rich has made such expenditure much more attractive and
that as a result even the poor now have to give up a larger
proportion of their income than they would have consented to do.101
These historical reflections may explain how the progressive individual
income tax (as well as the estate tax and the corporate tax) came into being
in the United States, and “ a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 102
But Holmes also said that historical explanations have no normative

94. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 42-43; Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 10).
95. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 52; Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 11).
96. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 11-12).
97. Id. (manuscript at 8).
98. Id.
99. Id. (manuscript at 11).
100. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 9.
101. Friedrich A. Hayek, Progressive Taxation Reconsidered, in ON FREEDOM AND FREE
ENTERPRISE 265, 273 (Mary Sennholz ed., 1956).
102. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
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power.103 Is there anything that can be deduced from the historical
background regarding the question of why the rich should be taxed today?
I would argue that the answer is yes, because the United States in the
early twenty-first century is facing a similar phenomenon to the one that
occurred a hundred years earlier: a huge increase in inequality and the rise
of new concentrations of wealth and power, fueled this time by the
information revolution of the late twentieth century. It is well documented
that the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a significant increase in inequality of
both income and wealth.104 Indeed, the entire period from 1968 to 1998 was
characterized by increased income inequality. Census data indicate that the
share of before-tax family income decreased for families below the
eightieth percentile of the income distribution, while the share of income
for the top twenty percent of families increased by an average of 14%, and
the richest five percent received a 33% increase.105 From 1983 to 1998, the
same data indicate that the after-tax share of income of the wealthiest
twenty percent increased by 5%, and of the richest five percent by 16%,
while the income of all other households decreased.106 The explanation for
this increase in inequality is complex, relating to the increased rewards to
highly skilled types of work (the “ symbolic analysts,” to use Robert
Reich’s term) and the decreasing reward for everyone else.107 Technological
change is usually seen as the main reason for this gap,108 although
globalization and the ability of corporations to seek the cheapest source of
labor overseas also has some role to play.109
But why should Americans care if their society is becoming more
unequal? From a consequentialist perspective, the answer is that across
countries, increased inequality is usually associated with lower growth
rates.110 There are several explanations for this phenomenon, all of which
receive some empirical support. Inequality may engender political
instability, which reduces investment and growth. Inequality may also
reduce investment in human capital among those with little wealth, which
may reduce growth. And inequality may increase fertility among the
103. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
104. See, e.g., LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN AMERICA (2000); EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP
HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA (1995); Edward M.
Gramlich et al., Growing Inequality in the 1980s: The Role of Federal Taxes and Cash Transfers,
in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 225 (Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk
eds., 1993); Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1995, at A1.
105. Stephen B. Cohen, Vanishing Case for the Flat Tax: Growth, Inequality, Saving, and
Simplification, 86 TAX NOTES 675, 685 (2000); Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 35).
106. Cohen, supra note 105, at 681. These figures do not reflect the 2001 stock market drop,
which presumably somewhat narrowed the difference.
107. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 177 (1991).
108. DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 12 (1997).
109. Id. at 16.
110. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 16.
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nonwealthy, which also decreases per capita growth.111 On the other hand,
inequality may also be argued to reduce growth if it leads to redistributive
fiscal policies that overtax the rich, but there is little empirical evidence for
this view.112
In my view, however, the best argument in favor of taxing the rich is
not that inequality may threaten growth, or even threaten revolution.
Rather, it is the argument that underlay attempts to tax the rich from the
beginnings of the American experiment: that there is something inherently
undemocratic in extreme concentrations of wealth and power.113
There are three arguments why extreme concentrations of wealth are
undemocratic. The first two are obvious: In the American system of
government, great wealth can buy political favors (often at minuscule
expenditures) and finance runs for office (at somewhat greater but still quite
limited costs).114 The third is more subtle—that vast inequality of wealth is
socially destructive because it degrades relationships among people
(cultural, social, and political) and eventually undermines the sense of
community on which a democratic polity must rest.115 This argument is
particularly true in a country like the United States, which is not bound
together by ties of ethnicity, culture, or language.116
The recent experience of the United States government in trying
unsuccessfully to limit the power of the richest man in the world and of the
corporation he controls is a good reminder that the problems that led to the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment are still with us.117 The belief in
progressive income taxation (as well as estate and corporate taxation) must

111. See Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and
Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259, 260-61 (1998); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution, and
Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 150-54 (1996).
112. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 16; see also Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality
Harmful for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 617-18 (1994) (arguing that postwar OECD data
weakly support this view). All of these studies are complicated by the fact that there are inherent
problems in attempting to separate out the effects of tax policy on prosperity and the extent to
which prosperity facilitates tax collection. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 17.
113. This was the viewpoint of Sidney Ratner, the first historian of American income
taxation, who viewed progressive income taxation “ as preeminently fit for achieving and
preserving the economic objectives of democracy.” Brownlee, supra note 83 (manuscript at 4)
(citing SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 14 (1980)). Ratner wrote
from a Cold War perspective, and subsequent historians have tended to disagree, but his writing
still has persuasive force today.
114. See, for example, the recent presidential runs of Ross Perot and Steve Forbes. These
problems can conceivably be addressed by comprehensive campaign finance reform, but such
reform will not address the economic and social power of the rich.
115. For the importance of civic engagement and “ social capital,” see ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE (2000).
116. This viewpoint is shared by writers in the communitarian tradition (which stems
ultimately from the republican views of the Founders), such as Walzer and Sandel, as well as by
writers in the British socialist tradition. See, e.g., R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 1-8,
180-84 (1920) (arguing for a community-based view of efficiency and equity).
117. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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ultimately rest on the same conviction that animated the reformers of the
1890s: that extreme concentrations of power resulting from extreme
concentrations of wealth in the hands of private individuals who are
unaccountable to the majority is an unhealthy phenomenon in a democracy.
Such private individuals exercise degrees of power and influence that run
counter to the ability of the government of the people to govern the country
in accordance with the people’s wishes, as expressed in democratic
elections. It is these observations, and not merely some aesthetic objection
to inequality, that underlie the drive toward keeping the progressive
individual income tax (as well as the corporate tax and the estate tax) in
place.118
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW BALANCE
BETWEEN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
Even if one supports, as I do, the ideal of progressive income taxation
as a way of reducing inequalities of wealth and power, it is still necessary to
balance these goals with the need to maintain a healthy growth rate for the
economy. While the conclusions of Slemrod’s book indicate that for most
real activities such as savings rates or the labor/leisure tradeoff there is little
evidence of an adverse impact of current tax rates on the rich, one must
remember that these rates (even before the 2001 tax cut) were quite low by
historical standards. A return to the seventy percent or ninety percent top
tax rate of the period from 1935 to 1980 is not in the cards, because it may
well have an adverse impact on actual labor supply and saving. In addition,
such high rates lead to enormous pressure on taxpayers to devise ways of
reducing their tax liability, which in turn lead to deadweight losses in the
form of unproductive investments in various tax avoidance schemes.119
118. This is not to say that there is no place for other kinds of taxes as well. It is precisely
because I view the income tax primarily as a means for limiting the power of the very rich (top
one percent) that I would support proposals made by Michael Graetz to relimit the reach of the
income tax to the rich and to impose a value added tax (a type of consumption tax) on everybody
else. See GRAETZ, supra note 4, at 264-66. But this is a very different notion from abandoning the
income tax in favor of a consumption tax that would tax Mr. Gates only on the minuscule fraction
of his wealth that he consumes.
In addition, an analysis of the income tax that focuses on reducing power differentials as its
main goal can have interesting implications for various tax policy debates. For example, such a
view suggests that although the deductions for medical, casualty, and state and local tax costs are
acceptable because the outlays reduce private power, the deductions for personal interest
(including home mortgage interest) and charitable contributions should be curtailed at top income
levels because both borrowing and giving to charity increase the social power of the rich. Such an
analysis also has implications for the corporate tax, which I hope to address in a future project.
119. Given the constraints imposed by efficiency concerns, one may ask whether the income
tax can ever be an effective vehicle for reducing power differentials. In theory, one can construct
an income tax similar to the one expounded in Henry C. Simons’s classic Personal Income
Taxation, SIMONS, supra note 38, in which all accessions to wealth (including gifts and bequests)
are included in the base and the top marginal tax rate can be as high as ninety-four percent. Such
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Thus, in the current state of our knowledge, I would not call for drastic
top marginal rate increases, although I would support reversing the 2001
top marginal rate cuts and not allowing the estate tax to expire.120
Fundamentally, given the constraints imposed by the need to maintain
economic growth, the income tax by itself cannot curb the economic power
of the rich sufficiently to maintain a democratic community. But some
combination of the income tax, the estate tax, and direct regulation of
political and economic activities via campaign finance reform and antitrust
enforcement might. This was the belief that underlay the original enactment
of the income tax, and in my view it is still valid today.121
This Review, however, also has a simpler practical point: to call for a
rebalancing between efficiency and equity considerations in the current
legal tax literature. It is fair to say that since the 1950s, and even more so
since the 1980s, academic legal writing on taxation has been dominated by
efficiency issues and by the optimal tax approach.122 This reflects changes
in public economics, which, during the same period, shifted its attention to
focus primarily on efficiency and growth.123 These changes in turn reflect
the view that was also expressed by Simons, Blum, and Kalven, and still
resonates in Slemrod’s book—that issues of distribution are a matter of
aesthetics or political value judgments and therefore beyond the purview of
economic analysis.124 Economists generally believe that they “ have no

an income tax could have very significant redistributive effects but would probably lead to
unacceptable reductions in economic growth and efficiency losses from tax avoidance schemes.
But even an income tax that is acceptable from an efficiency point of view (e.g., with a top rate of
fifty percent) can have significant redistributive effects if coupled with an estate tax and a
corporate tax. In fact, the income tax was seen by the progressives of the late nineteenth century
as only one vehicle in curbing the power of the rich, together with the corporate tax and antitrust
enforcement. Brownlee, supra note 4, at 38-39.
120. With state taxes and the phase-out of exemptions and deductions, the pre-2001 statutory
top rate of 39.6% could approach a real top marginal rate of almost 50%, which seems intuitively
to be about the most one can expect to collect in tax without running into major incentive
problems. In any case, we know from experience that the U.S. economy did very well in the 1990s
with a top rate of 39.6%, so reversing the 2001 tax cuts seems a safe bet. Both the 2001 marginal
rate cuts and repeal of the estate tax are set under current law to reverse in 2011. Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150.
121. In general, the tradeoff between efficiency and equity is more complicated than would
appear at first glance. Some policies adversely affect both (e.g., policies causing recession and
throwing the poor out of work), and some help both (e.g., investment in infrastructure and
education, and other beneficial social outlays). At the extremes (confiscatory taxation, excessively
generous welfare programs), there is a tradeoff, but there is a wide range of policies (and tax rates)
at which no tradeoff can be shown. See ROBERT KUTTNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION 3 (1984).
122. Some have even argued that fairness has no place in legal theory. E.g., Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (2001).
123. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 36-44). Compare RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE
THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 5, 19 (1959) (emphasizing both equity and efficiency), with
HARVEY S. ROSEN, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1999) (emphasizing efficiency).
124. See Slemrod, supra note 2, at 19-20; Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 37).
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special competence in determining which distribution of resources is
appropriate.” 125 As Slemrod writes,
The approach of mainstream modern public finance economics to
these issues has been to accept, for the sake of argument, the right
of government to redistribute income through the tax system (and
other means); to sidestep the ethical arguments about assessing the
value of a more equal distribution of economic outcomes; and to
instead investigate the implications of various value judgments for
the design of the tax system.126
Such an attitude to distributive issues may be fine for public finance
economists, although it did not characterize the economics profession
before the 1950s and still does not characterize some of it today.127 But it
does not excuse the abdication of equity in favor of efficiency by most legal
tax academics, especially in some of the elite law schools. Most of the
writing on distributive issues in these circles has been done within the
confining framework of optimal tax theory.128 Even the debate between
income and consumption taxation, which in the 1970s still involved fairness
considerations, has recently been waged entirely on technical grounds with
little or no explicit consideration of equity issues.129
It is time for legal tax academics to redress the balance. Efficiency
issues cannot be neglected, but on that ground the last word must depend
crucially on empirical evidence that lawyers are ill-equipped to produce.
But issues of equity and “ tax justice” must be explicitly addressed as well.
To do otherwise risks abandoning the field to the many opponents of
progressivity in taxation. Slemrod’s book is an outstanding contribution to

125. Ventry, supra note 64 (manuscript at 45).
126. Slemrod, supra note 2, at 10.
127. The new economic historians (such as Douglass C. North) and economists engaged in
historical and comparative institutional analysis show that the economics profession (as
distinguished from its offshoot in law schools) has not lost its ability to grapple with historical and
cultural forces shaping issues such as the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the community. See,
e.g., Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994).
128. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 39; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 122. As Kyle
Logue and Ronen Avraham have written in their excellent critique of Kaplow and Shavell,
“ [M]ost of the leading tax-policy scholars, as well as many prominent law-and-economics
scholars, are welfarists.” KYLE D. LOGUE & RONEN AVRAHAM, THE TAX SYSTEM VERSUS THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: REDISTRIBUTION IN THE WELFARIST STATE (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at
9, on file with author).
129. Compare Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975) (emphasizing fairness), with Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash
Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996) (setting forth a purely technical analysis).
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the efficiency side of the debate. One can only wish that as good a volume
could be produced on the equity side.130

130. In fact, two such books are forthcoming—the superb volume edited by Ventry and
Thorndike, TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64, and the equally outstanding LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS
NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (forthcoming 2002). But much more
work is needed in this direction.

